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USA/USSR: 
Architecture and War
RICHARD ANDERSON
On March 15, 1945, a week after Germany began its final offensive of World
War II in the oilfields of Hungary, Soviet architects, engineers, and students
flocked to an exhibition at the House of the Architects in Moscow. They
found images of prefabricated houses, descriptions of heating and plumbing
utilities, samples of building materials, and proposals for the radical reform
of residential construction after the end of the war. All of the material pre-
sented in Moscow was drawn from American sources, and the show itself
was a gift from an American institution: the Museum of Modern Art.
Soviet engineers and architects welcomed this timely exhibition. According
to one report, “it met an acute need felt in the tremendous rehabilitation pro-
gram in war damaged areas, in the housing construction required for tens 
of millions [of] people rendered homeless by the war.”1 Another observer
ascribed global significance to the event: “I welcome this very interesting
exhibition as the first step in the great work of rehabilitating peacetime hous-
ing construction all over the world.”2 This display of American building
seemed to provide solutions to many of the problems facing Soviet architects
on the eve of reconstruction.3
If the responses of Soviet architects to this exhibition are to be taken seri-
ously—and they should be—a set of interlocking questions presents itself.
Why were American techniques so highly valued in Moscow in 1945? How
are we to interpret this relationship between architects in the USSR and their
American colleagues? What was at stake in this exchange for Soviet profes-
sionals? How, finally, did the evident goodwill between American and Soviet
architects in 1945 devolve into the antagonism of Cold War ideologies by the
end of the decade?
Events such as this exhibition invite us to reassess the state of Soviet
architectural culture in the 1940s. Soviet architecture from the 1930s to the
early 1950s—the era of high Stalinism—is often considered to be a negative,
monumental response to the avant-garde experiments of the 1920s. “Socialist
Realism,” as one commentator has written, “put the torch, once and forever,
to the humanistic nostalgias and semantic utopias that lay at the very heart
of the avant-garde groups.”4 Yet to make the demise of avant-garde utopias
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the measure of subsequent practice in the USSR is to obscure our view of
Soviet architecture’s complexity. Similarly, attempts to interpret Soviet
architecture through the analytical concept of totalitarianism risk overstat-
ing architecture’s instrumentalization by party politics.5 My concern is not
to restate the fate of avant-garde utopias in a state socialist regime but to
reevaluate the dynamics of Soviet architecture in light of hitherto undocu-
mented events and relationships. This reevaluation presents Soviet archi-
tects as participants in an international field of architectural ideas during
Stalin’s “Great Patriotic War.”
The territorial and theoretical dislocations precipitated by World War II
require an approach that is sensitive to new alliances and positions within
Soviet architectural culture. Without this sensitivity we cannot appreciate
the wartime relationship between the United States and the USSR. As allies
in the conflict, the two countries sought both to defeat a common enemy and
to imagine a common future. The two countries entered into a necessary, if
opportunistic, alliance after Germany invaded the Soviet Union and Hitler
declared war on the United States. In American-Soviet relations apprehen-
sion turned to appreciation as the United States supplied material aid to the
USSR through the lend-lease program. Framed by this grand alliance, Soviet
interest in American architecture acquired greater depth and intensity during
the conflict.6 Political coalitions and programs of architectural research pro-
ceeded in concert.
Soviet architects and planners believed that the path of postwar modern-
ization in the USSR would run parallel to that of the United States, and 
they attentively studied American developments. As American industry
expanded to produce military supplies and equipment, government funds
supported research and construction programs to house defense workers.
Legislation such as the Lanham Act of 1940 allocated millions of dollars for
residential construction.7 Prefabrication and new, nondeficit building mate-
rials promised to reduce construction costs and increase output. At sites
around the country private enterprise and federal agencies collaborated on
the rapid construction of defense housing. The degree of mass production
achieved by the American building industry offered Soviet architects a pro-
ductive model of architectural efficiency that could be adapted to large-scale
planning and implementation.
In the period between the USSR’s entry into the war in 1941 and the onset
of the ideological crackdown known as Zhdanovism in late 1946, Soviet
architects reformulated the tasks of their discipline. Of crucial importance in
this process was the emergence of the small, detached house as a problem of
architectural design. This building type acquired double significance: it both
Defense housing for the 
Glenn Martin aircraft plant near
Baltimore, Maryland. The houses
were designed in 1941 by
Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill
using Cemesto board developed
by the John B. Pierce Foundation
and the Celotex Corporation.
Published in Architectural Forum,
1941.
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redirected architectural thinking from the monumentality characteristic of
the 1930s to modest residential design, and it formed the basis for a produc-
tive dialogue with American architects on construction, planning, and build-
ing materials. Mass production—not of apartment buildings, but of small
houses—became a primary issue in the USSR, and Soviet architects, engineers,
and planners fused Americanism and progressive design into a persuasive
wartime ideology.8 This ideology was not imposed from above by the Communist
Party but emerged from a congruence of political and professional interests
in American-Soviet friendship and wartime modernization.
Professionals recognized that the problems facing architects in each coun-
try—questions of prefabrication, settlement planning, and the mass produc-
tion of building materials—were similar. In this convergence of architectural
thought, the opposition between distinct political regimes was offset by a
belief in a shared utopian project—what Susan Buck-Morss has described as
“the utopian dream that industrial modernity could and would provide hap-
piness for the masses.”9 But this open dialogue between American and Soviet
architects collapsed as World War II ended and the Cold War began. An ideol-
ogy of socialist specificity now eclipsed the internationalism of the Soviet
architectural profession. Thus, by the end of the 1940s ideologues such as
M.P. Tsapenko strained to differentiate Soviet and American practice, declar-
ing “the superiority of Soviet architecture over the architectural poverty of
the bourgeois world” to be “absolute and beyond question.”10
By tracing the contours of one consequential hypothesis—namely, that
American models of mass-produced housing possessed multivalent signifi-
cance for Soviet architects during World War II—we can reevaluate the 
postwar relationship between the two countries. The story of this little-
known wartime relationship between architects in the United States and the
USSR complements the familiar Cold War narrative of antagonism between
American and Soviet architectural cultures. Analyzing this wartime rela-
tionship reveals a second dimension to the Soviet campaign against
American architecture of the late 1940s: these attacks were not only politi-
cally motivated affronts to a new international rival; they were also exercises
in ideological reversal. Until we recognize the significance of the wartime
ideology of cooperation between American and Soviet architects, we will fail
to understand the content and urgency of the postwar ideology of antagonism.
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For although Cold War cultural politics enforced mutual estrangement,
Soviet architects ultimately dissolved relations with their American coun-
terparts not because the two groups had little in common but because their
concerns had become all too similar.
| | | | |
World War II did not arrest architects’ work; it reformulated architecture’s
tasks. When German forces attacked the USSR, the Union of Soviet
Architects issued an appeal to all its members, reminding them that “the suc-
cess of the war is decided not only on the front, but also in the rear.”11 During
the initial phase of the war architects inspected and built bunkers, initiated
industrial camouflage campaigns, and repaired damaged buildings.12
Yet architects’ wartime responsibilities changed dramatically as the Soviet
government relocated industrial operations from the western front to the
eastern interior.
The Soviet Council on evacuation was formally established in June 1941.
Designed as a strategy to keep enemy forces from capturing valuable indus-
trial operations close to the front, the Soviet evacuation effort had tremen-
dous architectural consequences. Moving equipment and workers from one
region to another required the resettlement of enormous populations. One
official in the People’s Commissariat of the Aviation Industry claimed that
the evacuation of just one engine plant required the dismantling of some
3,000 to 5,000 units of equipment and the transportation of up to 50,000
workers and their families.13
A significant consequence of the evacuation to the east was the reemer-
gence of the small, detached house as a primary architectural theme. “The
most important architectural problem of our time,” stated an editorial in
Arkhitektura SSSR (Architecture of the USSR) “is the problem of low-rise
residential construction.”14 Conditions in evacuated settlements required the
use of locally available building materials such as plaster and adobe, while
pressing needs for housing promoted the development of elementary prefab-
rication techniques. These and other factors made low-rise construction the
most economical form of building in the East.15 Although the conflict gave
new importance to this building type, it was by no means new to the 
Soviet Union. Some of the first projects for the Soviet city, such as Nikolai
Markovnikov’s Sokol settlement in Moscow, were based on the principles of
the garden city movement and were composed of detached houses.16 But
while architects such as Leonid Vesnin, Mikhail Barsch, and Moisei Ginzburg
had either built or promoted low-rise structures during the 1920s, the 1935
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plan for the reconstruction of Moscow directed architects’ attention toward
the architecture of the metropolis and away from the low-density periphery.17
Yet when Soviet architects revisited the problem of the detached house dur-
ing World War II, they drew not upon the Russian garden city movement and
the long tradition of “dacha” settlements but on American techniques of
mass production.
In the relatively liberal cultural climate of the war, many Soviet architects
coupled their interest in American developments with self-critical intro-
spection.18 In order to understand where Soviet architecture was going, it was
necessary to assess where it had been. Records of so-called creative discus-
sions of contemporary architecture held at the Moscow House of the
Architects document a remarkable conflation of professional self-criticism
and Americanism during the war years.19 This conflation, which was sup-
ported by the politics of alliance with the United States, destabilized meth-
ods of architectural thought and opened a space to chart a new path for
Soviet architecture.
In one of these “creative discussions” Karo Alabian combined a critical
appraisal of Soviet architecture’s development since the 1920s with a clear
call for the incorporation of American architectural advances into contem-
porary practice. Alabian had risen to prominence in the 1920s as a vocifer-
ous critic of Moscow’s avant-garde architectural groups.20 He secured
influence within the Soviet architectural profession through intrigue and
ruthless political maneuvering, ultimately becoming the secretary of the
Union of Soviet Architects—a position that wielded considerable power.21
Until now little has been known about Alabian’s activities during World War
II. Serving as the vice president of the Academy of Architecture and acting as
the chairman of the architectural section of the All-Union Organization 
for Cultural Relations Abroad (VOKS), Alabian emerged as an ardent sup-
porter of reform and internationalism within Soviet architecture during the
war years.22
At the “creative discussion” of August 10, 1943, Alabian criticized many
aspects of Soviet architectural practice, but his chief concern was the debil-
itating political climate of the architectural profession at the outset of the
1930s. The most significant problem within the profession, he claimed, “was
a sort of leveling [nivelirovka] of creative directions in Soviet architecture. . . .
This leveling [nivelirovka] of all currents in architecture, in my opinion, did
not further, but rather impeded our creative growth.”23 This “leveling” was
the forced dissolution of independent architectural organizations in April
1932 and the subsequent creation of the Union of Soviet Architects as the
sole organ of the profession.24 According to Alabian, the experimental nature
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of wartime construction presented one
possible way out of this professional cul-
de-sac. “We must,” he continued, “broadly
implement the achievements that we
have in our experimental laboratories and the practical knowledge that is
available in America, in particular in the field of wartime construction.”25
Coming from the secretary of the Union of Soviet Architects, this proposal
for architectural renewal through experimentation and appropriation of
American techniques carried great weight. 
Andrei Burov, one of the most articulate members of the Soviet architec-
tural profession, further developed these ideas in his influential essay “On
the Path to a New Russian Architecture” of 1943. In the 1920s Burov had
been a star student at the revolutionary art school VKhUTEMAS. Thereafter
he was briefly a member of the constructivist architectural organization OSA
(the Union of Contemporary Architects). During the 1930s Burov partici-
pated in the reconstruction of Moscow through the construction of several
apartment buildings, each of which synthesized new building technologies
with historical form.26 During World War II he demonstrated his abilities as a
theorist and critic of architecture.
Burov’s wartime assessment of Soviet architectural practice remains
unparalleled in its wit. Mocking what he considered the dominant method
of architectural design among Soviet architects, Burov parodied the routine
pictorialism of the creative process:
Take a piece of paper and, in this order, write down the following: 
1) cheerfulness, 2) industriousness, 3) mastery of past heritage, 4) national
form, 5) socialist content, 6) synthesis of the arts, etc. When you have
drawn your design, lay the paper on a table and look it over. Then take
a red pencil and see how you have done.
1. Cheerfulness? Check—the building is white. Make check mark.
2. Industriousness? Check—all 200 flats, all windows, stairs, and
doors are exactly the same. Check mark.
3. Heritage? Check—there is a Renaissance cornice. Check mark.
4. National form? Check—there are Russian window surrounds (or
Azerbaijani if the building is in Baku). Check mark.
5. Socialist content? Check. For whom is the house intended? For our
Soviet people, and thus we have an emblem. Check mark.
6. Synthesis? Check. The sculptures wear coats or shorts, depending
on the climate. Check mark.27
Architecture had become a hackneyed profession in the Soviet Union.
Left: Cemesto House developed
by Skidmore, Owings, and 
Merrill and the John B. Pierce
Foundation. Published in
Arkhitektura SSSR, 1943.
Opposite: Ivan Zholtovskii. House
on Mokhovaia St., Moscow, 1934.
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“Overburdened with historical deposits”
that impeded the “will to the new,” the
work of Soviet architects seemed out of
joint with contemporary technology and
creative experiment.28
Burov, like Alabian, proposed that
American architecture held promising
lessons for problems confronting Soviet
practice. “In America new architectural
ideas—freed from the nihilism of prose-
lytes and arising from industry—have begun to show the first sprouts of new
organic architectural forms.”29 Burov called for the implementation of
American planning and construction practices in the USSR: “The surest and
most progressive type of construction in the near future will be one- and two-
story houses.”30 The American low-rise settlement was an antidote to the
“colonies of amoebas” that Soviet high-rise buildings had produced. Yet, for
the lessons of America’s “organic architectural forms” to have any effect, 
a fundamental reorientation of Soviet architectural training would have to
take place. According to Burov, Soviet architects “constantly studied palaces
and temples, and the ordinary apartment houses that they later built began
to take on the forms of palaces and temples, leaving absolutely no artistic
means of expression for palaces.”31 If architects were to proceed from the war
on a “path to a new Russian architecture,” they would have to shift their
working methods “from a conception of the unique to a conception of 
the mass.”32
At a plenary meeting of the Union of Soviet Architects in late 1943 Burov
proposed that Soviet architects effect a revolution in housing not only by
learning from American precedents but through the direct purchase of
American technology. A top priority had to be “the acquisition from the USA
of a series of factories for the production of prefabricated low-rise houses
from ready-made components; a complex of factories that produces every-
thing necessary—from the foundations to the door handles.”33 The type of
technology transfer Burov proposed was not unprecedented. In the late 1920s
the Soviet Union had effectively imported America’s industrial architecture
by contracting Albert Kahn to construct a series of factories throughout the
USSR.34 Burov had been a part of the Soviet commission that traveled to
Detroit to broker the deal with Kahn, so he well understood the tactics of
technology transfer that the Soviet government could exercise.35 Progressive
architecture, he argued, could be bought.
The revisionist program supported by Alabian and Burov was not unique.
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Many Soviet architects looked to American low-rise housing construction as
a source of renewal, and innovations from the United States were widely
publicized in the USSR. Alabian even edited a series of books about the
“lessons of residential construction in the USA” for the Academy of
Architecture’s publishing house. These handbooks detailed American con-
struction, design, and planning for the Soviet professional audience.36 In the
preface to Roman Khiger’s book Maloetazhnye doma v SShA (Low-Rise
Houses in USA), Alabian noted that “American wartime construction and, in
particular, residential construction, which developed into the industrial and
semi-industrial erection of settlements of low-rise houses, has special sig-
nificance for us.”37
| | | | |
The interest of Soviet architects in the work of their American counterparts
was genuine and was supported by new vectors of exchange between the two
countries. American participation in the early phase of the war came in the
form of generous lend-lease agreements that granted material aid to Great
Britain and the Soviet Union.38 Lend-lease brought American know-how as
well as equipment, supplies, and raw materials to the UK and the USSR. The
relationship between architects in America and in the Soviet Union was par-
ticularly strong. Supported by both governmental and nongovernmental
organizations, the effort to aid Russian architects with American techniques
for postwar reconstruction was approached with unprecedented optimism.
The Architects’ Committee of the National Council of American Soviet
Friendship (NCASF) was the most active architectural organization to pro-
mote collaboration between the United States and the USSR during the war
years. The NCASF emerged from more radical American-Soviet friendship
movements of the 1930s.39 After its establishment in 1942, the NCASF
became the primary nongovernmental facilitator of American-Soviet cultural
exchange. The organization initiated a broad range of programs designed to
foster mutual understanding between the two countries. The promotion of
architectural exchange was but one aspect of the NCASF’s work.
After preliminary negotiations with the NCASF, the Architects’ Committee
was formed early in the winter of 1943 in New York City.40 Harvey Wiley
Corbett, the prominent New York architect, was named chair of the
Architects’ Committee. By the end of 1944 the Committee had outlined its
aims in a statement of purpose: first, to initiate an exchange of building and
planning information between the two countries; second, to acquaint
American architects and engineers with the requirements of the Soviet building
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industry; third, to familiar-
ize Soviet specialists with
American building develop-
ments; and fourth, to create “understanding and friendship” between pro-
fessionals in the USA and the USSR.41
The Committee’s first major achievement was the shipment of an exhibi-
tion of American building techniques to Moscow in late 1944. This show was
an extract of the Museum of Modern Art’s (MoMA) exhibition U.S. Housing
in War and Peace. Assembled on behalf of the Office of War Information,
MoMA’s exhibition was intended to present American wartime construction
to the Royal Institute of British Architects, but copies of the show ultimately
were circulated elsewhere.42 Whereas Australia and South Africa received
duplicates of the entire exhibition, the Soviet Union received only the por-
tion of the show devoted to wartime building technologies, which had been
organized by Vernon DeMars, a vice-chairman of the Architects’ Committee
of the NCASF.43 The techniques presented to the Soviet audience ranged
from onsite assembly, such as the precut packages offered by Sears-Roebuck,
to Buckminster Fuller’s Dymaxion Deployment Unit and the innovative
designs of the General Housing Corporation by Walter Gropius and Konrad
Wachsmann.44
The exhibition opened under the title “Rapid Construction in the USA”
in Moscow in March 1945 to a warm reception. As president of the
Architectural Section of VOKS, Karo Alabian delivered a brief speech dur-
ing the vernissage at the House of the Architects. Emphasizing the interna-
tional scope of the problem of reconstruction, he noted that “it is natural that
Soviet architects and builders have a lively interest in the valuable lessons of
their American colleagues, whose achievements in this area undoubtedly
have exerted a positive effect.”45 Photographs of the exhibition show groups
of Soviet architects huddled intently around displays of mechanical systems
and balloon frame construction. According to a report published in the
VOKS Bulletin, “the exhibition attracted a great deal of attention and was
viewed by several thousands of people.”46 The architect Nikolai Kolli wrote
in the guest book that “this exhibition is of tremendous practical significance.
It graphically demonstrates the possibilities that new types of construction
and new materials offer the architect.”47 For David Arkin, the subject of the
show was “of great importance,” and the exhibit as a whole was “another
aspect of the friendly cooperation between America and the Soviet Union in
the field of creative effort.”48 The exhibition and the responses it elicited
demonstrate that in early 1945 Soviet and American professionals imagined
a future of collaboration on the architectural front.
Installation view of Rapid
Construction in the USA 
exhibition at the House of 
the Architects, Moscow, 
March 1945. Published in
Prefabricated Homes, 1946.
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The NCASF sought to promote the
spirit of collaboration on American soil
as well. The American-Soviet Building
Conference, held in May 1945 in New
York City, was the largest event orga-
nized by the Architects’ Committee.
Assembling nearly two hundred and fifty American architects and some fifty
Soviet participants, the conference was devoted to problems of building
industry organization, prefabrication, industrial construction, and mechani-
cal systems of the small house.49 Among the American participants were
members of the Architects’ Committee such as Simon Breines, Serge
Chermayeff, and Herman H. Field. The Soviet panelists were drawn not from
the high-profile circle of individuals in Moscow but from the staff architects
and engineers of the New York–based Soviet Purchasing Commission.
The session devoted to prefabrication techniques was the largest of the
conference, and the statements made by Soviet panel members expressed
official aims with candor. Responding to a question about Soviet interest in
prefabricated houses, Mr. Dobrynin of the Soviet Purchasing Commission
noted that although prefabrication in the USSR was still in its infancy he
expected it to grow dramatically after the war’s end.50 Dobrynin claimed that
the Soviet Purchasing Commission had explored the possibility of buying
American technology outright: “We stated to the Government of the United
States that we wish to purchase eighteen new combined prefabricated home
plants, each of which will consist of a sawmill, woodworking plant, plywood
plant and assembly plant. These plants must produce about one hundred
thousand houses yearly.”51 Dobrynin was proposing a transfer of industry
from the United States to Russia on a scale that would have matched the tech-
nical aid and know-how sent to the USSR at the outset of the first five-year
plan, the Soviet Union’s drive for industrialization that began in the late
1920s. Although a purchase of this scale probably did not take place, the
Soviet Purchasing Commission’s stated desire to import technology and
equipment from the United States demonstrates that interest in American
architectural achievements extended well into the upper echelons of Soviet
bureaucracy.
Thus by mid-1945 the relationship between American and Soviet archi-
tectural professions had achieved an unprecedented degree of normalization.
The exhibition of American architecture presented in Moscow and the
American-Soviet building conference were only the most dramatic events in
this relationship that bound professions in each country together. Such
events manifested the potential opportunities for architecture in a political
Prefabrication panel at the
American-Soviet Building
Conference, May 5, 1945, 
New York City. Published 
in Proceedings, American-
Soviet Building Conference, 
New York, 1945.
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climate in which a common enemy united the
United States and the USSR. After a few short
but intense years of American-Soviet exchange
and collaboration, professionals in each country
could advance their similarities, allowing their
differences to fade from view. For the first time
Soviet and American architects seemed to be
facing the same problems and were engaged in a
common project.
| | | | |
But what were the tangible results of this
American-Soviet friendship? Although this rela-
tionship had become productive, it was not a
relationship of causality but of parallel interests.
During the war Soviet architects adopted diverse
approaches to low-rise construction, none of
which can be traced directly back to American formal models. As early as
October 1942 architects in Sverdlovsk and Nizhnyi Tagil had begun produc-
ing panels of laminated plaster for use in the housing industry.52 By February
1944, factories in the Urals had begun producing wooden panels and build-
ing details for modest, pitch-roof houses for Stalingrad’s reconstructed neigh-
borhoods.53 While the provinces attempted to rationalize construction,
Moscow architects drew on Russian national traditions. In the settlement of
Kostino near Moscow, Boris Barkhin constructed more than eighty-five log
houses, each fitted with carved wooden details reminiscent of traditional
Russian applied art.54 Although these developments demonstrate the revival
of interest in low-rise housing during the war, they hardly betray any
American influence. 
The most significant results of American-Soviet wartime cooperation were
programmatic in nature. The Commission for Scientific-Technical Problems
of Construction within the Academy of Architecture, organized in August
1944 by Karo Alabian, formalized Soviet research on American building
technology. According to Alabian, this commission was created “to evaluate
the level of our building technology in comparison with the level of building
technology in the USA and to assemble proposals for the radical improve-
ment of construction.”55 The Commission’s primary tasks, in the words of 
one participant, were to demonstrate that Soviet architects stood before “a
radical revolution in the field of technology” and to present a plan for the
Top: N. P. Shelomov. Duplex
house made of plaster panels,
Nizhnyi Tagil, Russia, 1942.
Published in Arkhitektura 
SSSR, 1944.
Bottom: Boris Barkhin. House 
in Kostino, near Moscow, 1945.
Published in Iu. Shass,
Arkhitektura zhilogo doma,
Moscow, 1951.
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reorganization of the building industry
to the Soviet government.56
The commission submitted its recom-
mendations to the Soviet government in
a lengthy report in 1945.57 This report
called for a general reorientation of the
Soviet building industry toward the mass
production of building materials and
prefabricated elements. Recognizing 
that the Soviet building industry had
admirably adapted to wartime condi-
tions, the commission nevertheless
maintained that most construction
remained amateurish and crude. “The
building industry of the USSR,” the commission found, “continues to this
very moment to be a backward [otstaiushchii] branch of the national econ-
omy and is lagging far behind the mighty building industry of the USA.”58
This was particularly apparent in the field of mass-produced housing. The
commission proposed the construction of a network of woodworking plants
and the establishment of a laboratory for experimental building technologies
within the Academy of Architecture to correct the situation. According to
Karo Alabian, the commission’s report was effective. “A special government
commission,” he later wrote, “drew up the comprehensive decree on the five-
year plan for the development of the building industry of the USSR based on
this work.”59 Through the work of Alabian’s commission, therefore, the
benchmarks of American production were inscribed within the Soviet plan-
ning apparatus. A mass of organizational data on the American house-build-
ing industry, not any particular architectural style or formal solution, was
assimilated by Soviet architects and engineers and adapted to their own
future requirements.
The construction program of the first postwar five-year plan (1946–1950)
promised to expand Soviet wartime research through the creation of a new
branch of industry for the mass production of prefabricated houses.60 Twenty
new factories devoted to wooden construction and fourteen devoted to metal
and ferro concrete construction were to be created on Russian territory alone.
The journal Arkhitektura i stroitel’stvo (Architecture and Construction) pro-
jected that “each day fifteen houses, complete with built-in furniture, will
come off the conveyor of each factory.”61
Experimental prototypes for the prefabrication of small houses in the
Soviet Union appeared as early as 1946.62 Under the guidance of the architect
Top: F. Lizovskii. Prototype 
for prefabricated house, near
Moscow, 1948. Published in
Arkhitektura i stroitel’stvo, 1948.
Bottom: Boris Barkhin. TsV-1a
series houses, Bolshevo, near
Moscow, 1947. Published in
Arkhitektura i stroitel’stvo, 1948.
Opposite: Natan Osterman 
and others. AD5-1 experimental
house, Bolshevo, near Moscow,
1948. Published in Iu. Shass,
Arkhitektura zhilogo doma,
Moscow, 1951.
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F. Lazovskii, the woodworking complex at Karacharovo, an industrial district
southeast of Moscow, developed a prototype for use in settlements and 
suburbs in Russia’s central regions.63 In 1947 a model residential district was
erected in Bolshevo, a Moscow suburb, using Boris Barkhin’s TsV-1a series
panel house, which was put into mass production by 1949.64 The most tech-
nologically sophisticated prototype was the AD5-1 series that the Academy
of Architecture produced with furnishings and radiant heating.65 Thus,
although the production figures projected by planners typically were hyper-
bolic, the Soviet building industry did heavily invest in the mass production
of small, detached houses after the war. 
By the late-1940s Soviet architects and engineers were no longer just call-
ing for the mass production of small houses but were testing the limits of the
Soviet building industry. In 1949 one commentator claimed that “with each
year the growth of factory-produced housing [zavodskoe domostroenie] will
contribute more and more to the betterment of living conditions for working
people and will obtain an ever greater influence on the architectural appear-
ance of districts, towns, and entire cities.”66 The prefabrication of small
houses, which had formed the basis for wartime collaboration between the
United States and the USSR, was poised to become a major feature of 
the national economy and a motor for the reconstruction of towns across the
Soviet Union.
| | | | |
Although Soviet architects and engineers continued to develop models for
the mass production of small houses into the late 1940s, the wartime confla-
tion of Americanism and progressive design would be systematically dis-
mantled before the end of the decade. When the United States and the USSR
emerged from the war as international competitors, the professional rela-
tionships between Soviet and American architects came into conflict 
with the rising ideology of socialist isolationism. Politics and architecture
slipped out of joint. Polarized by the cultural logic of the nascent Cold War,
Soviet architects disputed the relevance of American models of mass hous-
ing and openly proclaimed the architectural poverty of the small house in 
the USA.
In an article published in mid-1949, the architect Pavel Blokhin claimed
that “any contradiction between the tasks of architecture and the industrial-
ization of residential construction is foreign to the new branch of socialist
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industry—the Soviet prefabrication of houses [sovetskoe zavodskoe
domostroenie].”67 This was a fundamental difference between Soviet and
American methods:
In the United States of America, where prefabricated housing pursues
primarily commercial aims, where industry and art are alienated from
the interests of workers, the insurmountable break between the art of
architecture and industrial house-building occurred long ago. This
break becomes more profound with the full degeneration of American
architecture, with the many formalist perversions that are peculiar to
decadent bourgeois art.68
Blokhin’s aim was to cast the project for mass-produced small houses as a
distinctly Soviet endeavor. American precedents, which had dominated
Soviet discussions of the housing question during and immediately after the
war, were now systematically expelled from Soviet architectural discourse.
Blokhin’s anti-Americanism reflected twin developments in Soviet poli-
tics and ideology after 1946: Zhdanovism and anticosmopolitanism.
Zhdanovism refers to the ideological crackdown initiated by the Central
Committee Secretary Andrei Zhdanov in late 1946. In a bid for power within
the Communist Party, Zhdanov launched a campaign against wartime laxity
in questions of ideology. Beginning in the field of literature with an August
1946 party decree on the journals Leningrad and Zvezda, Zhdanovism was a
phenomenon that aimed to eradicate “ideologically harmful” elements from
Soviet culture. This ideological realignment culminated in Zhdanov’s
announcement of his “two camp” theory at the founding of the Cominform
in September 1947. Responding to Winston Churchill’s March 1946 speech
announcing the construction of an “Iron Curtain” and the offer of Marshal
Plan funding for the reconstruction of Europe, Zhdanov proclaimed that the
world was divided into imperialist and anti-imperialist camps.69 By early
1949 the ideology of anti-internationalism culminated in the so-called anti-
cosmopolitanism campaign within Soviet politics and culture.70 Although
Zhdanovism and anticosmopolitanism were distinct phenomena, they each
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contributed to an atmosphere of ideological
polarization and anti-Americanism in the
USSR at the outset of the Cold War.71
When Zhdanov divided the world in two,
Soviet architects were compelled to adjust to
the new political circumstances. The ideo-
logical laxity that had permitted American-
Soviet collaboration was gone, and the Soviet
architectural profession would have to restate
its aims in the language of the new political
climate. A first response to Zhdanovism was
to underline the importance of urban plan-
ning as the defining characteristic of socialist
architecture. “One of the most important
qualities which differentiates Soviet archi-
tecture from the architecture of the past and
from the architecture of the contemporary West,” read an editorial in
Arkhitektura SSSR, “is the leading role of the urbanist basis in all fields of
architectural activity.”72 This new emphasis on the superiority of Soviet
urban planning led to the public criticism of the urban theories advanced by
Frank Lloyd Wright, Eliel Saarinen, and José Luis Sert.73 American urbanism
was recast as the negative projection of Soviet practice.
The next phase of the anticosmopolitanism campaign culminated in what
the American architectural critic Peter Blake has called the “Soviet
Architecture Purge.” In late 1948 a campaign against the Academy of
Architecture of the USSR was initiated because of the allegedly “pro-Western,
pro-American and general cosmopolitan outlook of its leading members.”74
Andrei Burov was among the first architects to be censured in 1948. Burov’s
enthusiasm for America’s “new organic forms” had now become dangerous.
In the pages of Pravda, the newspaper of the Communist Party, Aleksandr
Vlasov, then the chief architect of Kiev, initiated a public campaign against
“pro-Western” sentiments among members of the Academy of Architecture
and vehemently criticized Burov’s pro-American position. Burov’s state-
ments were, according to Vlasov, “a glaring expression of the antinational
ideology of neoconstructivism, an example of the servile worship of the deca-
dent art of architecture in America, a slander on Soviet art and on our build-
ing industry.”75 In this abrupt reversal of ideological coordinates, nationalism
replaced internationalism as a guiding principle of Soviet practice. 
An article by G. Kris’ko published several months later in Pravda contin-
ued to attack the academy for fostering “pro-Western” sentiments. This time
Opposite: Montage of American
and British prefabricated houses.
Published in Arkhitektura i
stroitel’stvo, 1949.
Right: Poster for an exhibition 
of Soviet architecture with the
names of “disgraced” architects
crossed out. Published in
Architectural Forum, 1949.
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the architect and writer Roman Khiger was criticized for his publications
about American housing and planning techniques during World War II.76 In
1947 the Academy of Architecture had accepted Khiger’s wartime research
as a dissertation entitled “Lessons of Settlement Planning and Residential
Construction in the USA.”77 Kris’ko claimed that Khiger’s work was essentially
anti-Soviet in its “pro-Western” orientation: “Bowing before the bourgeois
West, Khiger appears in his ‘works’ as a fierce propagandist of bourgeois con-
structivism.”78 Worst of all, the acceptance of Khiger’s dissertation was just a
symptom of the fact that the academic council of the Academy of Architecture
had become a haven for a “group of groveling cosmopolitans.”79
The campaign against allegedly “pro-Western” sentiments had significant
effects on Soviet architectural culture. Administrative positions within the
Union of Soviet Architects were redistributed, and the academy’s leadership
was reshuffled. But, as Elena Zubkova has pointed out, purges in the postwar
era cannot be equated with the public violence of the Great Terror of
1937–38, when hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens were summarily
sentenced for political crimes. Repression in the late 1940s targeted the
elite.80 In the field of architecture, only the most prominent members of the
profession were accused of cosmopolitanism and of “bowing to the bourgeois
West.” Others, who had expressed similar “pro-Western” sympathies, con-
tinued to work effectively within the profession.
In the late 1940s significant positions in the Soviet prefabrication indus-
try were occupied by architects and engineers who had been committed to
Americanism during the war but who nevertheless survived the “Soviet
Architecture Purge” unscathed. Several of these figures assembled at a con-
ference on the prefabrication of wooden houses, held in March 1949 at the
Moscow House of the Architects.81 At this event P. Novozhilov, the director of
the Central Administration for Standardized House-Building (Glavstandartdom),
and Paul Ershov, the head engineer of Glavstandartdom, each discussed the
rapid acceleration of the organization’s production capacity. Neither
Novozhilov nor Ershov had been particularly influential in Soviet architec-
tural discourse, but both had worked for the Soviet Purchasing Commission
during World War II, and each had participated in the Soviet-American
Building Conference organized by the NCASF in New York City.82 That
Novozhilov and Ershov survived the anticosmopolitan outburst unscathed
illustrates the uneven nature of the campaign. Perhaps these technical pro-
fessionals were too valuable to lose to an ideological crackdown, or perhaps
their relationship to American architecture was not considered significant.
Either way, their leadership in the Soviet prefabrication industry after 
1949 demonstrates continuities between the wartime enthusiasm for
Model of prototype for a pre -
fabricated house displayed at 
the conference on prefabricated
housing held at the Moscow
House of the Architects, 1949.
Published in Arkhitektura i
stroitel’stvo, 1949.
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American techniques and the postwar campaign for Soviet isolationism in
the building industry.  
Despite these lingering continuities, the anticosmopolitan campaign was
an attempt to dismantle all professional relationships between American and
Soviet architects. These relationships had to be symbolically purged in order
to complete Soviet architecture’s realignment with the new political line of
anti-imperialist nationalism. In this the campaign was largely successful:
Khiger, Burov, Alabian, and the Academy of Architecture received public
condemnation. To praise the achievements of American architecture—as
even Soviet officials had done during the war—could now spell the end of a
career. This had become a dangerous form of architectural treason.
Yet amid the barrage of scathing words directed at allegedly “pro-Western”
architects, the basic topic of exchange between the United States and the
USSR—the architecture of the small, mass-produced house—was never
called into question. Soviet architects never rejected this building type on
ideological grounds. On the contrary, they asserted the true, Soviet identity
of the small, prefabricated house through another form of ideological rever-
sal. Whereas Roman Khiger wrote in 1944 that “the bold experimentation,
organization, and architectural merits,” of the mass-produced house in the
United States made it “a worthy and able competitor to the skyscraper,” only
five years later Pavel Blokhin would proclaim that “the prefabricated house
is a material realization of deep Soviet humanism and an expression of the
Stalinist concern for people.”83 Humanized and Stalinized, this building type
emerged from the anticosmopolitanism campaign not as a lingering reminder
of wartime enthusiasm for American construction but as a fully assimilated
element of socialist industry.
By 1949, therefore, the Soviet architectural profession’s relationship to the
American mass-produced small house had come full circle. During the war
this building type was the basis for professional relationships between the
United States and the USSR, but by end of the 1940s it had become a critical
point of distinction. The atmosphere of collaboration supported by the
American-Soviet wartime alliance evaporated with the rise of Zhdanovism
and anticosmopolitanism. What remained were a series of programs—
including the five-year plan for the development of the building industry—
and designs for the mass production of small houses that had been developed
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in dialogue with American precedents. The ensuing architectural purge cen-
sured the promoters of Americanism, but it did not fundamentally change the
direction of the Soviet building industry. The Soviet small house survived
the ideological crackdown of the late 1940s, but it did so in an ideologically
transfigured form: it was now said to be the embodiment of a “deep Soviet
humanism.” As the world was divided into two camps, a haze of denuncia-
tions and chauvinistic assertions obscured the American-Soviet relationship
that had fostered the development of the Soviet prefabricated house. The
veiling is understandable because in the cultural climate of the late 1940s,
when promoting “pro-Western” positions was tantamount to treason, this
ideological haze was the primary tool available to the Soviet architectural
profession as it came to terms with the Communist Party’s new political
agenda. Yet behind this veil endured a concern not that exposure to American
concepts and techniques had stunted the growth of Soviet architecture but
that this American-Soviet friendship had proved to be all too productive.
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